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SAINT LOUIS UNIVERSITY SCHOOL OF LAW

AN HISTORICAL NOTE ON THE SIGNIFICANCE OF THE STIGMA
RATIONALE FOR A CIVIL RIGHTS LANDMARK

TOMIKO BROWN-NAGIN*

I. INTRODUCTION
The stigma of segregated schools is the central theme of Chief Justice Earl
Warren’s opinion for the Supreme Court in Brown v. Board of Education.1 The
Brown Court openly acknowledged that its emphasis on stigma was an
unconventional approach to reasoning about the meaning of the Equal
Protection Clause. Yet, the Court’s turn to external sources was necessary
given its determination that the clause’s legislative history was inconclusive on
the question at hand—whether Congress meant to outlaw segregation in
schools.2 As the Court explained, “In approaching this problem, we cannot
turn the clock back to 1868 when the Amendment was adopted . . . . We must
consider public education in the light of its full development and its present
place in American life throughout the Nation.”3
Hence, the Court premised its landmark decision on the very contemporary
and intangible concept of stigma. Even if segregated schools are equal in
terms of physical facilities and other factors, they are “inherently unequal,” the
Court decreed, because the fact of separation is “usually interpreted as
denoting the inferiority of the negro group [and this] sense of inferiority . . . .
has a tendency to [retard] the educational and mental development of Negro
children . . . .”4 Support for the proposition that the stigma created by school
segregation denies equal protection of the laws is found in Brown’s eleventh
* Associate Professor of Law and History, Washington University in St. Louis. J.D., Yale Law
School; Ph.D., Duke University. This essay reflects comments that I made at the 2003 Childress
Lecture, presented by William Nelson. Thanks are owed to Bill for inviting me to participate in
the symposium by joining a panel of historians who discussed Brown’s implementation on the
local level. Thanks are also owed to fellow panelists, Kevin Kruse and Anders Walker, for a
learned and lively conversation about this important subject, and to Daniel Nagin and Chris
Bracey for comments on a prior draft of this essay.
1. 347 U.S. 483 (1954).
2. Id. at 489-93 (discussing the history of the Fourteenth Amendment and determining that
it did not provide a conclusive answer to the question of how equal protection of the laws should
apply in the area of public education).
3. Id. at 492-93.
4. Id. at 494 (internal quotations omitted) (alterations by Brown Court).
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footnote, which references a number of psychological and sociological
studies,5 among them the much-maligned Kenneth Clark doll study.6
The Brown Court’s failure to articulate an adequate basis in law for its
decision has been the subject of debate among constitutional scholars for
generations. Constitutional scholars—beginning in the late 1950s with
Wechsler,7 Pollak,8 and Black,9 and continuing through the recent efforts of
Balkin, Michelman, and Bell10—have praised, criticized, and defended the
logic and outcome of Brown. The emphasis that the Court placed on the
intangible harms of segregation has been a focal point of scholars’ criticism of
the landmark decision. Three types of objections have been raised to the
Justices’ reasoning about stigma. Some argue that this decidedly non-legal
concept was an inappropriate basis for the decision.11 Even if stigma was a
sound basis for finding segregation unconstitutional, others argue that it was
improper for the Court to make such a finding.12 Still others attack the finding
itself; these scholars dispute the notion that African-American children were
irreparably harmed by segregated schools and argue that Brown should be
understood as requiring quality schools notwithstanding their racial
configuration.13 Though they differ on the question of whether the Court’s
5. Id. at 494 n.11.
6. For criticism of the study, see Joseph A. Baldwin et al., The Black Self-Hatred Paradigm
Revisited, in BLACK PSYCHOLOGY 141 (Reginald L. Jones ed., 3d ed. 1991) and The Doll Man
and His Critics, in REMOVING A BADGE OF SLAVERY: THE RECORD OF BROWN V. BOARD OF
EDUCATION 48-57 (Mark Whitman ed., 1993).
7. See Herbert Wechsler, Toward Neutral Principles of Constitutional Law, 73 HARV. L.
REV. 1 (1959) (arguing that judicial decisions should be based on reasoned principles rather than
merely outcome-oriented, naked expressions of judicial power and claiming that Brown and its
progeny were not based on such principles).
8. See Louis H. Pollak, Racial Discrimination and Judicial Integrity: A Reply to Professor
Wechsler, 108 U. PA. L. REV. 1, 31-32 (1959) (arguing that the Reconstruction Amendments were
designed to fully emancipate blacks and that this principle supports the decision in Brown,
Shelley v. Kramer, and Smith v. Allwright).
9. See Charles L. Black, Jr., The Lawfulness of the Segregation Decisions, 69 YALE L.J.
421, 421-27 (1960) (arguing that the principled basis for Brown was to find intentional
disadvantaging of blacks contravenes the Fourteenth Amendment’s command that blacks not be
significantly disadvantaged by the state).
10. See WHAT BROWN V. BOARD OF EDUCATION SHOULD HAVE SAID (Jack M. Balkin ed.,
2001).
11. See, e.g., Wechsler, supra note 7, at 31-34.
12. See, e.g., Pollak, supra note 8, at 31-32.
13. See, e.g., RAYMOND WOLTERS, THE BURDEN OF BROWN: THIRTY YEARS OF SCHOOL
DESEGREGATION 282-89 (1984) (describing desegregation as a naive educational reform, while
noting that social problems in segregated schools undermine black students’ academic
performance); Derrick A. Bell, Jr., Serving Two Masters: Integration Ideals and Client Interests
in School Desegregation Litigation, 85 YALE L.J. 470 (1976) (questioning who is the true
“client” in school desegregation litigation and arguing educational improvement and
“instructional profit” for African-American children should be the long-term goals of
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finding that segregation was harmful was accurate or appropriate, all of these
works approach Brown on the same terms—as doctrine—and then stake out
normative positions about the force and soundness of the Court’s legal
reasoning.
This essay considers Brown’s treatment of stigma from an historical
perspective, but it accepts the opinion on its own terms. My purpose is not to
recapitulate arguments for or against stigma as an appropriate basis for the
decision. Here, I consider the socio-historical context in which the law of
Brown was created toward the end of exploring a broader question: how the
stigma concept relates to African-American ambivalence about Brown v.
Board of Education.
Although black ambivalence about Brown might appear to be a
phenomenon of recent vintage—one connected to the “black pride” movement
of the late 1960s and 1970s14 or the multiculturalism movement of the early
1990s15—in fact it has deep historical roots. The historical record should be
revised to correct received wisdom. The notion that African-Americans across
time and place uniformly supported the NAACP’s campaign to integrate the
schools is an historical misconception. Episodes of African-American
resistance to efforts to implement Brown have occurred in various places and
at many points in time, though the significance of these incidents typically has
been misunderstood. Communities in cities such as Atlanta, Georgia; Detroit,
Michigan; San Francisco, California; Boston, Massachusetts; St. Louis,
Missouri; Oklahoma City, Oklahoma, and Prince George’s County, Maryland,
have witnessed efforts to implement Brown that were beset by conflict among

desegregation campaigns); see also GARY ORFIELD & SUSAN E. EATON, DISMANTLING
DESEGREGATION: THE QUIET REVERSAL OF BROWN V. BOARD OF EDUCATION, 37-38, 84-87
(1996) (discussing the question of whether segregation was good for African-Americans from a
critical perspective); Kevin Brown, Do African-Americans Need Immersion Schools?: The
Paradoxes Created by Legal Conceptualization of Race and Public Education, 78 IOWA L. REV.
813, 817-34 (1993) (discussing need for alternative educational options that take into account the
cultural and social environment of African-Americans and the legal paradoxes arising from the
application of the Equal Protection Clause to immersion schools); Kevin Brown, Revisiting the
Supreme Court’s Opinion in Brown v. Board of Education from a Multiculturalist Perspective, in
BROWN V. BOARD OF EDUCATION: THE CHALLENGE FOR TODAY’S SCHOOLS (1996) (concluding
that, with the termination of mandatory school desegregation, multicultural schools are not in the
nation’s future because the Court’s school desegregation opinions have been premised on the
notion that segregated schools are not harmful to white students).
14. See Wendy Brown-Scott, Race Consciousness in Higher Education: Does “Sound
Educational Policy” Support the Continued Existence of Historically Black Colleges?, 43
EMORY L.J. 1, 48-49 (1994).
15. See generally Kevin Brown, Revisiting the Supreme Court’s Opinion, supra note 13.
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the decision’s intended beneficiaries regarding whether or on what terms
integration should occur.16
This essay brings an historical perspective to bear on such episodes of
black ambivalence about the civil rights landmark. In the process I
demonstrate that the pre- and post-Brown histories of African-American
communities can inform discussions about the significance of Brown’s focus
on stigma in ways that existing constitutional scholarship does not. A
consideration of how the NAACP’s constituents experienced life before and
after Brown sheds light on the costs and benefits that plaintiffs associated with
the process of implementing Brown, as compared with the vicissitudes of life
under the regime of de jure segregation. History shows that AfricanAmericans did not all experience Jim Crow in the same way; thus, they did not
necessarily share a common view about how to remedy the inequities of
segregated school systems. An array of factors internal to African-American
communities—matters overlooked by other constitutional scholars—helps to
explain why Brown’s promise of quality, integrated schools has eluded most of
its expected beneficiaries.17 Such a client-centered examination of Brown’s
history is a necessary supplement to scholarship that waxes poetic about
Brown’s redemptive significance in constitutional history without considering

16. For recent scholarship advancing this thesis, see Tomiko Brown-Nagin, Class Actions:
The Impact of Black and Middle-Class Conservatism on Civil Rights Lawyering in a New South
Political Economy, Atlanta, 1946–1979, at 64-67 (2002) (unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, Duke
University) (on file with author) (discussing socio-political factors that resulted in settlement of
an Atlanta school desegregation case in a manner that deviated from the NAACP Legal Defense
Fund and national NAACP policy of pursuing integrated schools) [hereinafter Brown-Nagin,
Class Actions] and Tomiko Brown-Nagin, Race as Identity Caricature: A Local Legal History
Lesson in the Salience of Intraracial Conflict, 151 U. PA. L. REV. 1913, 1924-66 (2003)
(discussing settlement of an Atlanta school desegregation case on terms that de-emphasized pupil
integration) [hereinafter Brown-Nagin, Race as Identity Caricature]. See also DANIEL J. MONTI,
A SEMBLANCE OF JUSTICE: ST. LOUIS SCHOOL DESEGREGATION AND ORDER IN URBAN
AMERICA (1985) (discussing school desegregation in St. Louis); Bell, supra note 13 (discussing
problems in Boston, Detroit, and Atlanta school desegregation cases); James Traub, Separate and
Equal, ATLANTIC MONTHLY, Sept. 1991, at 24 (discussing school desegregation in Oklahoma
City). See also Adams v. United States, 620 F.2d 1277 (8th Cir. 1980) (noting the conflict
between two groups of African-American plaintiffs regarding the remedy, with one group
preferring neighborhood schools and a second group preferring a remedy that would result in
meaningful pupil integration); Ho v. San Francisco Unified School Dist., 965 F. Supp. 1316
(N.D. Cal. 1997) (discussing Chinese students who alleged that the student assignment plan
required by a consent decree in school desegregation action originally brought by AfricanAmerican students violated their equal protection rights); Vaughns v. Bd. of Educ. of Prince
George’s County, 742 F. Supp. 1275 (D. Md. 1990) (discussing a biracial group of teachers who
challenged involuntary transfers made pursuant to a desegregation plan).
17. See ORFIELD & EATON, supra note 13, at 1-5, 16-19 (discussing how the Supreme
Court’s recent school desegregation decisions foster resegregation and discussing the movement
to dismantle desegregation orders during the Reagan Administrations).
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the experiences and desires of the communities in which implementing the
decision proved most difficult.
Understanding Brown in socio-legal context, and more particularly,
through the eyes of the putative beneficiaries who were skeptical of the
decision’s impact on their lives, is especially appropriate now, during Brown’s
semi-centennial. Two generations of students have experienced the legal
system’s fits and starts toward compliance with the landmark civil rights
norm,18 ultimately to learn that Brown’s command to desegregate schools only
applies in narrow circumstances.19 Now that Brown’s doctrinal significance is
construed so narrowly,20 the most meaningful questions to ponder about the
landmark case relate to matters external to law, strictly speaking. Foremost
among these questions is how school systems deprived of the force of the
structural injunction should and can address the educational needs of racial
minorities who still suffer from the vestiges of de jure segregation. The history
of campaigns to implement Brown, especially those that civil rights lawyers
lost, shed light on how these needs might be defined and law’s proper role in
such an endeavor.
II. BROWN’S BENEFICIARIES BEFORE AND AFTER THE LANDMARK DECISION
The project of taking seriously African-American ambivalence about
Brown requires sustained intellectual engagement with the question of to what,
precisely, were blacks reacting when they expressed skepticism of Brown, or
of the manner in which Brown was implemented. Were they opposed to
integration as a matter of principle, or did they become skeptical of Brown’s
desegregation mandate only after it became clear that whites’ resistance to
integration was unyielding? Were matters external to law more significant
factors in African-Americans’ ambivalence about Brown than developments in
the law? Was African-American ambivalence about Brown widespread
throughout the group or limited to certain elements of the community? And
finally, how does the Brown Court’s finding that segregation was stigmatizing

18. The period of greatest movement toward compliance occurred from 1968 through the
mid-1970s, the era marked by three momentous decisions. See Green v. County School Bd. of
New Kent County, Va., 391 U.S. 430 (1968) (first case in which the Court made clear, among
other things, that voluntary, “freedom-of-choice,” desegregation plans that did not result in
meaningful pupil integration did not meet constitutional requirements); Swann v. CharlotteMecklenburg Bd. of Educ., 402 U.S. 1 (1971) (condoning expansive remedial measures,
including busing, to achieve integrated schools); Milliken v. Bradley, 418 U.S. 717 (1974) (ruling
that suburban districts are not required to participate in desegregation orders absent proof of their
direct and affirmative participation in activities that caused segregation in central cities). For a
discussion of the impact of these cases, particulary Milliken, see ORFIELD & EATON, supra note
13, at 10-13.
19. See ORFIELD & EATON, supra note 13, at 53-71.
20. See id. at 1-5.
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relate to African-Americans’ ambivalence about Brown? More particularly, to
what extent does African-Americans’ experience of life under Jim Crow,
segregated schools, in particular, support the opinion’s emphasis on stigma as
the rationale for ordering school desegregation?
Social histories that capture African-American communities in the years
before and after Brown can illuminate the answers to these questions and
provide crucial information about how Brown’s beneficiaries experienced the
new civil rights norm. Historical explorations of African-American life under
de jure segregation are especially important; nevertheless, the tendency among
scholars, particularly scholars of the law, is to view the pre-Brown period
exclusively through the lens of deprivation, as if the Court’s stigma rhetoric
accurately described the complex reality of human experience during this era.21
This essay approaches this era open to the possibility that deprivation was not
the sole factor shaping the social consciousness of African-Americans living
under segregation, notwithstanding the many ways in which Jim Crow
circumscribed their life possibilities. This atypical scholarly perspective yields
clues about the constituent elements of blacks’ political22 and educational

21. For instance, Richard Kluger’s celebrated book on Brown describes life under
segregation in terms that suggest that all African-Americans experienced subordination in exactly
the same way, and thus were all sure to experience Brown as a kind of salvation. Of segregation,
he says: “It was nothing short of economic slavery, an unbreakable cycle of poverty and
ignorance breeding more poverty and a bit less ignorance, generation upon generation.”
RICHARD KLUGER, SIMPLE JUSTICE: THE HISTORY OF BROWN V. BOARD OF EDUCATION AND
BLACK AMERICA’S STRUGGLE FOR EQUALITY 7 (1975). Similarly, Kluger writes of the AfricanAmericans of Clarendon County, South Carolina:
[W]herever they went and whatever they tried to do with their lives, they were badly
disabled, irreparably so for the most part, by the malnourishment that the poverty and
meanness of their Clarendon birthright had inflicted upon the shaping years of their
childhood. Their minds had not been fertilized half so well as their cotton . . . . Nothing
seemed to change.
Id. This approach provides a perfect setup for a narrative emphasizing Brown’s revolutionary
impact on African-American life, notwithstanding evidence inconsistent with this narrative of
progress. Nevertheless, Kluger’s generalization doubtlessly is accurate when applied to AfricanAmericans living in Clarendon County, South Carolina, and I do not suggest otherwise.
22. Monographs too numerous to count have been devoted to the subject of the political
identities of whites, especially southern whites. See, e.g., W.J. CASH, THE MIND OF THE SOUTH
(1941); V.O. KEY, JR., SOUTHERN POLITICS IN STATE AND NATION (The Univ. of Tenn. Press,
1984) (1949). Many works focus on the attempt by African-Americans to gain the right to vote.
See, e.g., STEVEN F. LAWSON, BLACK BALLOTS: VOTING RIGHTS IN THE SOUTH, 1944–1969
(1976). Such scholarship, however, which is focused on national politics and the law of voting,
misses local variations on the issue of voting rights and does not address the question of how nonelectoral dynamics influenced African-American life. More recent scholarship, see, for example,
MICHAEL C. DAWSON, BEHIND THE MULE: RACE AND CLASS IN AFRICAN-AMERICAN POLITICS
(1994), is moving toward a more multi-factored analysis of African-Americans’ relationship to
politics, even if it continues to be nationally focused.
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identities23 under segregation, and hence, offers insights about the values that
influenced plaintiffs’ actions during Brown’s crucial implementation phase.
A.

Pre-Brown Atlanta

Because of its unique place in the history of the South and the nation,
Atlanta provides an ideal backdrop for exploring questions of the sort raised
here. Before Brown, when the NAACP’s strategy to attain equality in
education focused on teacher salary equalization, black Atlantans toed the
organization’s line regarding public education.24 The salary equalization
campaign fit well with the demographics of Atlanta, which had boasted a
significant African-American middle-class since the beginning of the
Twentieth Century, one including entrepreneurs, doctors, and lawyers, but
most importantly, a large contingent of educators and school administrators.25
Atlanta was considered the capital of black higher education during the first
half of the Twentieth Century; it was home to six educational institutions,
including Atlanta University, where W.E.B. DuBois taught for many years,
and Morehouse College, the alma mater of Dr. Martin Luther King, Jr.26
Atlanta’s educational preeminence cannot be underestimated when analyzing
the path that Brown, and the Civil Rights Movement, generally, took in
Atlanta. These schools inculcated an ideology that combined W.E.B.
DuBois’s rights-consciousness with Booker T. Washington’s self-help
philosophy27 and produced the leaders that populated Atlanta’s AfricanAmerican middle-class, including its corps of teachers and administrators.
Given this milieu, it comes as no surprise that many of Atlanta’s black
educators enthusiastically supported the NAACP’s teacher salary equalization
campaign. In 1943, local attorney and NAACP branch leader Austin Thomas

23. In using this term educational identity, I mean to suggest questions about AfricanAmericans’ perceptions of education (i.e. its value, efficacy, and purpose), their academic
abilities, and how they experienced the human actors involved in the educational process under
segregation, especially teachers, but administrators as well. For theoretical works that suggest
how intellectual identity is created and discuss the public purposes of education, see PAULO
FREIRE, PEDAGOGY OF THE OPPRESSED (1970) and HENRY A. GIROUX, SCHOOLING AND THE
STRUGGLE FOR PUBLIC LIFE: CRITICAL PEDAGOGY IN THE MODERN AGE (1988). For social
scientific works that explore these themes, see JEAN ANYON, GHETTO SCHOOLING: A POLITICAL
ECONOMY OF URBAN EDUCATIONAL REFORM 14-38 (1997). For historical works related to the
topic, see JAMES D. ANDERSON, THE EDUCATION OF BLACKS IN THE SOUTH, 1860–1935 (1988).
24. MARK V. TUSHNET, MAKING CIVIL RIGHTS LAW: THURGOOD MARSHALL AND THE
SUPREME COURT, 1936–1961 passim (1994).
25. See JOHN DITTMER, BLACK GEORGIA IN THE PROGRESSIVE ERA: 1900–1920, at 59-60,
147 (1980); Brown-Nagin, Class Actions, supra note 16, at 64-67.
26. See DITTMER, supra note 25, at 60.
27. On W.E.B. DuBois’s philosophy, see DAVID LEVERING LEWIS, W.E.B. DUBOIS:
BIOGRAPHY OF A RACE 289 (1993). On Booker T. Washington’s philosophy, see LOUIS R.
HARLAN, BOOKER T. WASHINGTON: THE MAKING OF A BLACK LEADER passim (1972).

SAINT LOUIS UNIVERSITY SCHOOL OF LAW

998

SAINT LOUIS UNIVERSITY LAW JOURNAL

[Vol. 48:991

(A.T. Walden), along with Thurgood Marshall and Edward Dudley of the
NAACP Legal Defense Fund (LDF or Inc. Fund), filed a class action
challenging unequal teacher pay scales.28 The suit resulted in the abolition of
facially discriminatory pay scales, and ultimately, led to systemic pay increases
for many African-American school personnel.29
The African-American leadership’s support for educational equality during
the pre-Brown period was not limited to activities that coincided with the
interests of its teachers and administrators. Prominent African-Americans also
waged campaigns to raise the quality of education offered to the city’s black
children. Led by the Atlanta Urban League, these leaders commissioned
studies that demonstrated gross inequities in the funding of black and white
schools.30 Armed with this data, they then made requests to the board of
education to improve and build new elementary and secondary schools for
African-American students.31 These campaigns led to a reduction in the
disparate rates at which African-American and white schools were funded.32
Despite these efforts, however, Atlanta’s white schools remained far superior
to its black schools leading up to and well after Brown.33
B.

Response to Brown

Although Atlanta’s African-American leadership is fairly characterized as
activist on the issue of education during the pre-Brown era, an important
segment of it—teachers—reacted with ambivalence to the Supreme Court’s
1954 decision declaring segregated schools unconstitutional. In the days
following the May 17 ruling, the local black daily, the Atlanta Daily World,
reported that black educators were adopting a “wait-and-see” attitude toward
Brown,34 while other leading African-Americans were hailing the decision.35
One black teachers’ organization, the Georgia Teachers and Education
Association, categorically refused to endorse Brown, despite pressure from
Atlanta NAACP branch leaders to do so.36 Thus, it was clear early on that
black educators did not necessarily view school desegregation as beneficial,
and African-Americans would not necessarily speak in one voice on the
matter.
For its part, the Atlanta branch of the NAACP embarked on a high-profile
campaign in praise of Brown in the ruling’s wake. A.T. Walden announced his
28.
29.
30.
31.
32.
33.
34.
35.
36.

Brown-Nagin, Class Actions, supra note 16, at 205-06.
Id. at 206.
Id. at 200-04.
See id. at 198-204.
Id. at 202.
Brown-Nagin, Class Actions, supra note 16, at 202-03.
Id. at 211.
Id. at 211-12.
Id. at 211.
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belief that “Georgia would obey the law” and promised that the branch would
soon move forward with plans to implement Brown in the city.37 At a two-day
meeting of regional NAACP officials that was held in Atlanta a few days after
the decision in Brown was announced, leaders of the local NAACP branch
joined in a statement issued by the national NAACP calling for an immediate
halt to school segregation and promising that there would be “no compromise”
on the issue.38 The group also issued the “Atlanta Declaration,” which
instructed all NAACP branches to petition local school boards to “abolish
segregation without delay.”39 The declaration represented an acceptance of a
call to service by the national NAACP, which had passed a resolution on July
3, 1954 stating:
If these rights and opportunities, already sanctioned in law, are to become a
reality, the Association and all of its branches must initiate and carry through
greatly expanded programs of community action designed to involve the entire
membership of the NAACP and influence large circles of citizens beyond our
ranks.40

Considering the local and national NAACP’s rhetoric acknowledging that
Brown would only be successfully implemented with community support, it
would be reasonable to assume that a great deal of activism took place in
Atlanta in the decision’s wake. In fact, nothing much happened to implement
Brown in the weeks, months, and years following the decision.41 Compromise
and delay characterized the behavior of Atlanta branch officials. Instead of
urging speedy compliance with Brown, Walden ordered an “exhaustive study”
of how desegregation should proceed.42 Despite the local NAACP branch’s
moderate course, white decision makers were unmoved. The Atlanta Board of
Education made clear its intention to obstruct compliance with Brown in June
1955, when nine black students filed petitions seeking to desegregate Atlanta’s
schools.43 The board responded by passing a resolution ordering the
superintendent of schools to “‘study’ . . . the relationship between race and IQ
and the ability of blacks to teach whites.”44
Still, the Atlanta NAACP branch persisted on its moderate course. The
branch’s leadership responded to the board with a request that it issue a “firm
statement of policy that the schools would be desegregated,” but to no avail.45
Nevertheless, Atlanta’s African-American leadership failed to agitate
37.
38.
39.
40.
41.
42.
43.
44.
45.

Id. at 212.
Brown-Nagin, Class Actions, supra note 16, at 212.
Id.
Id. at 194.
Id. at 213.
Id.
Brown-Nagin, Class Actions, supra note 16, at 214.
Id.
Id. at 214-15.
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aggressively for compliance; instead, it continued to seek Brown’s
implementation by relying on press releases and carefully-worded
resolutions.46 Almost four years passed after Brown was decided before the
branch filed a class action to implement the decision’s desegregation
mandate.47
C. Explaining the Ambivalent Response to Brown
The obvious question that this historical record raises is why did Atlanta’s
African-American community proceed in such a slow and restrained manner in
response to Brown? More particularly, why did the leadership steer such a
moderate course after Brown was decided when it had been committed to the
pursuit of educational equality before Brown? Several factors explain the
switch in approach, if not commitment, to achieving equal educational
opportunity. All of them run counter to the Brown Court’s assumption that all
African-Americans experienced life under segregation as unerringly harmful or
viewed themselves as powerless in the face of Jim Crow.
1.

Law as A Secondary Route to Equality

The first and most important factor militating against aggressive advocacy
for Brown’s implementation was the black leadership class’s preference for a
political, rather than a legal, strategy for achieving equal rights. This political
strategy involved a two-pronged approach consisting of bloc voting to
influence mayoral elections, together with informal politics—gentlemen’s
agreements made in back rooms, out of the public eye, with influential white
business and civic leaders.48 This strategy was well-suited to a people whose
educational credentials and social class inculcated an identity as the Talented
Tenth, the DuBoisian formulation that implied that it was the black elite’s duty
to adopt a paternalistic ethos toward the less well-heeled elements of the
African-American community.49
The black leadership’s political approach to resolving race-related
problems met with some success in the years before, and immediately
following, Brown. Relying exclusively on bi-racial negotiation, the leaders
convinced whites to build a new hospital complex and housing developments
for the city’s African-American population.50 Both projects were developed on
a segregated basis without objection from the African-American leadership,

46.
47.
48.
49.
50.

Id. at 215.
Id.
See Brown-Nagin, Class Actions, supra note 16, at 37-99.
See id. at 65-66; see also LEWIS, supra note 27, at 288-89.
Brown-Nagin, Class Actions, supra note 16, at 80-87.
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although their counterparts in other cities chided Atlantans for their failure to
challenge Jim Crow.51
As a consequence of its preference for incremental, political approaches to
civil rights, Atlanta’s African-American leadership did not view law as the
primary means through which race-related matters could, or should, be
resolved. Hence, the Inc. Fund’s effort to implement Brown in Atlanta was
preordained to be an uphill battle, with influential local blacks tending to view
the New York-based civil rights lawyers as interlopers, in much the same way
as local whites viewed them.
2.

A Prized Tradition of Separate Education

A second factor shaping the black leadership’s ambivalent reaction to
Brown was an outgrowth of Atlanta’s status as the capital of black higher
education. As previously noted, many of the men who steered the course of
Atlanta’s civil rights movement were educated at the city’s historically black
institutions of higher education.52 One significant result of this common
heritage was that the decision-makers were inclined to have confidence in
African-Americans’ ability to become well-educated and powerful in social
spaces apart from whites.
Even more significantly, the relatively large number of educators and
school administrators within the city’s black middle class, many of whom also
were graduates of the local black colleges,53 understood that desegregation of
the schools was not likely to be in their economic interests.54 The fears voiced
by many African-American teachers across the South that desegregation would
take away their livelihoods were well-founded; however, the pattern of
discriminatory dismissals of black educators was not a prominent feature of
post-Brown Atlanta, in part because so little desegregation occurred there over
time.55 Nevertheless, the interests of the teachers and administrators loomed
large over the school desegregation case and ultimately proved decisive.

51. See id. at 88-96.
52. Id. at 65, 79-80.
53. For an overview of the class structure of Atlanta’s African-American community during
the relevant period, see id. at 67.
54. See Tomiko Brown-Nagin, The Transformation of a Social Movement into Law? The
SCLC and NAACP’s Campaigns for Civil Rights Reconsidered in Light of the Educational
Activism of Septima Clark, 8 WOMEN’S HIST. REV. 81, 105-13 (1999) (discussing financial loss
of African-American teachers as a result of the NAACP’s campaign to end segregation in
education); Scott Baker, Testing Equality: The National Teacher Examination and the NAACP’s
Legal Campaign to Equalize Teachers’ Salaries in the South, 1936–63, HIST. OF EDUC. Q.,
Spring 1995, at 49 (discussing racial discrimination and inequality within educational institutions
as a result of salary differentials based on the National Teacher Examination).
55. See Brown-Nagin, Race as Identity Caricature, supra note 16, at 1944-45.
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Insignificant Opposition to Elite Control of Decision-Making

A third factor constraining the pace and nature of Atlanta’s response to
Brown was the lack of a significant challenge to the African-American elite’s
civil rights strategy—that is, to their allegiance to formal and informal politics,
rather than law, as the proper means to achieve racial change. The
headquarters of the Student Non-violent Coordinating Committee (SNCC)
were located in Atlanta; however, SNCC was unsuccessful in its attempt to
alter the leadership’s approach to civil rights activism.56 Similarly, elite
control of decision-making in Atlanta prevented Dr. Martin Luther King, Jr.’s
Southern Christian Leadership Conference (SCLC) from waging an all-out
assault on segregation in the city or interfering with the black leadership’s
chosen approach to racial justice.57 Hence, the direct action movement waged
by SNCC and SCLC in other cities was not the powerful force for change in
Atlanta that it had been in Montgomery, Greensboro, Birmingham, or
Memphis during the 1950s and 1960s. Dr. King acknowledged this reality
when he commented in 1963: “Something strange and appalling has happened
to Atlanta. . . . While boasting of its civic virtue, Atlanta has allowed itself to
fall behind almost every major southern city in progress toward
desegregation.”58 The consequences of this vacuum were great. As a result,
there was no counter-pressure to the moderate course that the city’s AfricanAmerican leadership embraced after Brown. Ambivalence toward Brown
carried the day.
4.

The Inc. Fund’s Strategic Errors

A fourth factor militating in favor of the black leadership’s ambivalent
response to Brown was the Inc. Fund’s failure to give sustained attention to
Atlanta—a city whose size and stature made it deserving of great
consideration. The Inc. Fund’s inattention to Atlanta was due in part to the
split that occurred between the NAACP and the Legal Defense Fund (LDF) in
1956.59 As a result of the separation between the two, the lawyers were cut off
from the membership of the NAACP, and thus, from a vital source of support

56. See Brown-Nagin, Class Actions, supra note 16, at 100-03, 127-63.
57. See ADAM FAIRCLOUGH, TO REDEEM THE SOUL OF AMERICA: THE SOUTHERN
CHRISTIAN LEADERSHIP CONFERENCE AND MARTIN LUTHER KING, JR. 176-77 (1987)
(discussing domination of the Civil Rights Movement in Atlanta by an older generation of elites).
58. Id. at 175.
59. Tomiko Brown-Nagin, After the Split: Local Branch Decline as Factor in the NAACP
Legal Defense Fund’s Campaign to Implement Brown v. Board of Education in Atlanta, in FROM
THE SUPREME COURT TO THE GRASSROOTS 4-5 (forthcoming, Duke Univ. Press) (on file with
author) (arguing that the ineffective local NAACP branch with a distant relationship with the
national NAACP and NAACP Legal Defense Fund (LDF) undermined the LDF’s school
desegregation effort); Brown-Nagin, Class Actions, supra note 16, at 272.
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for the school desegregation campaign.60 The Inc. Fund was almost
completely disengaged from its client base during the crucial period after
Brown was decided.61
The practical result of the Inc. Fund’s inattention to Atlanta was that local
attorneys handled the school desegregation case until the mid-1960s,62 and, for
all of the foregoing reasons, were not aggressive in their demands to the
Atlanta Board of Education and to the courts. Token school desegregation did
not occur in Atlanta until 1961, a remarkably late date given Atlanta’s
reputation as the South’s most racially progressive city.63 When the Inc. Fund
finally became involved in the case, it continued on its course of alienation
from its clients and was largely unsuccessful in the arguments that its attorneys
made before the courts.64 LDF lawyers Connie Motley and Howard Moore
filed numerous motions requesting that the presiding judge quicken the pace of
desegregation in the city; however, he rejected their arguments.65 The Inc.
Fund lost on virtually every important issue presented to the district court
during the 1960s.66
E.

All-Out African-American Resistance to Brown

The Supreme Court’s 1971 ruling in Swann v. Charlotte-Mecklenburg
Board of Education67 made meaningful school desegregation a mandate in
metropolitan areas, such as Atlanta, with a history of de jure segregation. In
view of Swann, LDF lawyers filed motions asking the district court to impose a
remedy that would eliminate some, but not all, of the all-black schools
remaining in the city school system.68 Atlanta’s black leadership might have
viewed Swann as relieving them of the obligation to negotiate with whites
regarding the terms of compliance with Brown’s mandate, for Swann had taken
discretion about whether to desegregate the schools out of the locals’ hands,
replacing it with the task of determining how it was to be accomplished.

60. See Brown-Nagin, After the Split, supra note 59, at 4-5.
61. See Brown-Nagin, Class Actions, supra note 16, at 267-69.
62. Id.
63. Id. at 248-50, 269-74.
64. Id. at 277-84.
65. Id. at 277-83.
66. Brown-Nagin, Class Actions, supra note 16, at 280-84.
67. Swann v. Charlotte-Mecklenburg Bd. of Educ., 402 U.S. 1 (1971) (endorsing noncontiguous zoning plans and busing to achieve racial balance in schools).
68. See Brown-Nagin, Class Actions, supra note 16, at 293-301. By 1970, during the busing
controversy raised in Calhoun v. Latimer, African-American students in Atlanta constituted
approximately seventy percent of the city schools’ student body. See GARY ORFIELD & CAROLE
ASKINAZE, THE CLOSING DOOR: CONSERVATIVE POLICY AND BLACK OPPORTUNITY 106-07
(1991). Thus, even under LDF’s plan, many segregated schools remained intact. See id. at 10412.
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Instead, Swann precipitated all-out resistance by influential AfricanAmericans to meaningful school desegregation. The Inc. Fund and the
national NAACP were dismayed and embarrassed when the local NAACP
president, along with distinguished leaders of Atlanta’s African-American
community such as Dr. Benjamin Mays, former president of Morehouse
College and the newly elected president of the Atlanta Board of Education,
rejected busing as a remedy for racial segregation in the public schools except
on a voluntary and very limited basis.69 This group negotiated with local white
elites a settlement of the school desegregation case that minimized busing, but
created new administrative posts explicitly set aside for African-Americans,
including the position of school superintendent.70
This settlement—which flatly rejected Brown’s integration ideal and
ignored Swann—ultimately was approved by the courts. As a result, Atlanta’s
school system remained virtually all-black, while other large cities, most
obviously, Charlotte, North Carolina, desegregated their schools.71 Atlanta’s
schools looked much like they did before Brown, and the city’s AfricanAmerican leadership had been instrumental in making them so.72
III. UNMASKING THE STIGMA HALF-TRUTH, BUT AFFIRMING THE HARM OF
SEGREGATION
Atlanta’s African-American leadership was proud of its accomplishment.
It had settled the school desegregation case on terms that produced Atlanta’s
first African-American superintendent, a feat that put the city at the forefront
of the ascendancy of African-American political power in the nation’s innercities during the 1970s.73 Soon, the black leadership class could lay claim to
the mayoralty, to a majority on the board of education, and to equal power with
whites on the city council, which was evenly divided with nine white and nine
black members.74 From their perspective, the settlement of the school
69. See Brown-Nagin, Race as Identity Caricature, supra note 16, at 1935-46.
70. Id. at 1935-36, 1944-46.
71. See ORFIELD & ASKINAZE, supra note 68, at 109-12.
72. Of course white resistance to desegregation also figured prominently in the path that
Brown took in Atlanta. Resistance came from all quarters of Atlanta society, but most
importantly from the board of education and the federal courts. See Brown-Nagin, Class Actions,
supra note 16, at 277-84. At no point did Atlanta’s white elite, which had convinced the press of
its progressiveness on racial issues, accept meaningful compliance with Brown. On Atlanta’s
reputation as a racially progressive city, see DAVID ANDREW HARMON, BENEATH THE IMAGE OF
THE CIVIL RIGHTS MOVEMENT AND RACE RELATIONS: ATLANTA, GEORGIA, 1946–1981, at 7273 (1996) (discussing descriptions of Atlanta as an “oasis of racial tolerance,” as a city “ashamed
of violent racial prejudice,” “different from other southern cities,” and as providing “some
grounds for hope” about the South).
73. See CLARENCE N. STONE, REGIME POLITICS: GOVERNING ATLANTA, 1946–1988, at 106
(1989).
74. Id. at 81.
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desegregation case on terms that increased black power in the central city
instigated a steady string of achievements. Black leaders finally had realized
the goal of exerting influence over public policy decisions, a role they had
actively sought since the years following World War II.75
A sense of social and political agency unites Atlanta’s African-American
leadership across time, from the years preceding Brown to the post-Brown
period and the era of Swann. This belief in black agency was nurtured over
time in the city’s institutions of higher education, its civic organizations, and
its professional circles.
Black teachers and administrators exerted a
particularly powerful influence over the leadership’s intellectual and political
identities and, ultimately, over the substantive policies that black agents of
change preferred. Black decision-makers identified and seized possibilities for
achieving incremental change in race relations under Jim Crow, and then
sought to preserve the stature and prosperity that they had achieved in their
own social circles even after Brown created the possibility of an integrated
society. Hence, in Atlanta the predicate for Brown and the Inc. Fund’s school
desegregation campaign—the assumption that segregation, most especially in
education, was harmful to all African-Americans—proved to be an
overgeneralization.
To assert that the stigma concept was an overgeneralization is not to claim
that segregation was harmless to Atlanta’s blacks. The city’s AfricanAmerican leadership understood that Jim Crow imposed constraints and
oppression in virtually every sector of black life. This understanding was the
impetus for the leadership’s agitation for more and better schools for AfricanAmerican students, its drive for competitive teacher salaries, and its insistence
on gaining and intelligently using voting rights before Brown, as well as its
backroom efforts to end state-sanctioned segregation in public
accommodations during the 1960s. The leadership’s preference for blackcontrolled de facto segregated schools can be understood as an effort to
minimize the harm to African-American students occasioned by white racism
or racial insensitivity, even if that preference also inured to the economic
benefit of individual black teachers and administrators.76
Yet, other blacks—those without a voice in decision-making—rejected the
leadership’s perspective that racial isolation was benign and refused to abide
by its decision to settle the school desegregation case on terms that maintained
that isolation. The Brown Court’s generalization that segregation was
stigmatizing in fact did apply to many, and probably most, of Atlanta’s black
schoolchildren, according to a group of black parents from poor and working-

75. See Brown-Nagin, Class Actions, supra note 16, at 45-55 (discussing black leaders’
voting rights activism and attempts to exercise political influence).
76. Regarding the issue of self-interest, see Brown-Nagin, Race as Identity Caricature,
supra note 16, at 1944-45.
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class neighborhoods that challenged the settlement. These parents’ conception
of stigmatic harm encompassed and focused on the material effects of school
segregation. They argued that their children suffered under segregation; they
were relegated to overcrowded and inferior schools that denied their daughters
and sons their constitutional right to equal protection of the laws. The poor
parents’ voices fell on deaf ears, however. The black leadership ignored them
and the courts refused to upend the settlement.77
IV. CONCLUSION
This essay has sketched, in broad strokes, the socio-legal history of the Inc.
Fund’s campaign to implement Brown in Atlanta. It has suggested factors that
explain black ambivalence about Brown and demonstrated that the stigma
rationale embraced by the Brown Court was apt for most segments of the
African-American community, but incomplete, or even inapt, when applied to
the all-important leadership class. The ranks of this “Talented Tenth” included
professionals, entrepreneurs, and a large cadre of educators who enjoyed
relative prosperity and autonomy despite Jim Crow. The African-American
leadership’s high self-regard and keen awareness of their privileged social
status affected the form of civil rights activism that they preferred (political
rather than legal) and the remedy to school segregation that they embraced (a
settlement that maximized personal autonomy and self-interest over a plan that
maximized pupil integration). The dissonance between the experiences of
Atlanta’s African-American decision-makers and other members of the
African-American community undermined the possibility that structural relief
for school segregation would be ordered. It upset a key assumption on which
the smooth implementation of Brown depended—the premise that AfricanAmericans, as a whole, were unified around the goal of implementing Brown
because their lives under segregation were bereft of hope and opportunity.
While constitutional scholars have emphasized how the rhetoric and logic of
Brown and the cases following it influenced how the civil rights landmark was
implemented on the local level, this essay suggests that social dynamics within
the black community also were immensely important factors shaping Brown’s
implementation. In this way, this synthesis of local and national social and
legal history complicates the conventional view of Brown. It enlivens Brown’s
history by showing that legal precedents alone cannot capture the complexity
of the human actors who translated and interpreted Brown’s meaning and
effect on the local level.
Constitutional scholars and historians, along with civil rights practitioners,
have recognized, to some extent, the importance of human agency to legal
change. Typically, however, these commentators have focused on whites’

77. See Brown-Nagin, Class Actions, supra note 16, at 335-60, 371-77.
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agency, more particularly, on whites’ intransigence to civil rights norms.78
Black ambivalence about Brown is rarely considered. A significant and
unfortunate consequence of the literature’s tendency to conceive agency as
white resistance is to keep discussions of Brown frozen in time, as if it is ever
1954 or 1955, when the forces of virulent racism were arrayed against the
heroic individuals fighting for equal education. The period from the late 1960s
through the early 1970s, when African-Americans finally achieved a
meaningful voice in electoral politics on the local and national levels, is
dismissed as a period of decline. This overview of Atlanta’s history corrects
this oversimplification by making clear that Brown’s beneficiaries influenced
the path of law as well.

78. Social scientists, for example, have been consumed with questions such as how and
under what circumstances (i.e. under what logic and authority) the law should compel compliance
with Brown, whether it is possible to counteract political resistance to the norm from the
President or Congress, and most recently, what incentives school districts can offer to whites to
foster voluntary desegregation. See supra notes 7-10; see also AMY STUART WELLS AND
ROBERT L. CRAIN, STEPPING OVER THE COLOR LINE: AFRICAN-AMERICAN STUDENTS IN WHITE
SUBURBAN SCHOOLS 74-75 (1997) (discussing monetary incentives to St. Louis and Kansas City,
Missouri, to accept black participants in voluntary desegregation programs). For a compelling
discussion of Brown and white resistance, see, for example, Michael Klarman, Brown, Racial
Change, and the Civil Rights Movement, 80 VA. L. REV. 7 (1994).
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